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(0)
Introduction.
Of all peoples on the face af the earthAmericans are the

most sensitive as to anything that relates to their MLiberty
Any restraint upon their freedom iramediately engages their
closest attentionand any possible infringment upon their
rights is at once investigated. For this reason has the subjeot of legislation interfering with the Freedom of Contract
called forth much discussion and argument of a most interesting nature. But the question is stilla mooted one -at
least it is generally deemed unsettled;and the recent legislation in relation to the subject has caused many of our
most conservative men to lament the present tendency of our
governmentand as many of our more socialistic body to
rejoice at the same tendency ;and has incited them to
demand still further legislation of the same nature. What
the indifferent majority will believewhen they awake enough
to appreciate the situation and take an active part in
deciding the matter,is at present an uncertainty,and indeterminable ; but judging from the remote as well as the not
far distant past,it would seem that public opinion will
be in favor of the existig policy.

(I)
PUBLIC POLICY -THE INITIATORY FORCE.

It has been most truly said by our greatest economists and
sociologists whose chief aim is to teach us true principles
of governmentthat the historical method of dealing with
any subject is the most profitable and the one most liable
to teach us correct views . So in a superficial way I shall
touch upon the history of the doctrine of freedom of contract
at various points through-out this paper.
To go back then for centurdtes,leaving aside all the
conditions of modern life-annihilating in our minds all the
influences of civilization,picturing man as controlled by the
same influences that now control the monkeys in the wilds
of Central Africa-we find man uncivilized and left to act
according to his own will,except as the physical superiority
of a companion held sway ever him. Then we certainly find
a condition as near to freedom of contract as possible. Yet
even then duress was a thumb-screw that bore down upon his
will and interlfered with his freedom
But it is unnecessary to go back this far,to firid the
theory of freedom of contract in such active operation
that a man could contract away his whole freedom.

(2)
There has been a time in the history of almost every nation
when a man had the perfect right to Pargain himself into
slavery if he chose
contract

.

entirely gone

Now that we find such rights of
it is altogether fitting that

we ask in what way were these rights withdrawn. Was it
alone because people no longer wished to sell themselves,
and refrained from exercising their own foolish tendencies

,

or was it because of legislation or what took the place of
laws then-custem,which was the unexpresseri but well impressed
will of the people. Findingso many instances where
punishment has been meted out for making these contractual
relations,I think that we are forced to believe that they
were not eliminated by universal consent but were suppressed
by the stigma of public opinion. Such bargains were so
clearly against public policy that they were done away with
long before slavery as an institution was abolished.
Public policy therefore ,which has been defined as the
prevailing opinion as to what is for the public good," was
the initiatery force which restricted the right to absolute
freedom of contract.

(3)

PUBLIC POLICY STILL MAKES THE LIMIT.
To the student of histery,a casual glance at the great
changes will suffice to convince him that the element of
public policy in the law of contracts,and in law generally,
is by no means of recent origin,but ewes its existence

to

the very sources of law . The abolition of free will
slavery mentioned in the preceding chapter is a striking
example of the earliest time. How strong this force was
among the Israelites is shown by the public indignation that
followed the bargain of Esau with his brother-selling his
birth-right for a mass of potage.
But it was not until the rise of the more civilized
nations of Greece and Rome that public policy became direct
and effective as an influence in the regulation of contracts
In Greece it was strong enough for many decades to centrol
the business and commercial interests,and confine them to
the limits of Greece herself ;no trading with foreign nations
being allowed beyond that which was absolutel$ necessary.
And the same was true of that great law-making nation
the Roman Empire. For many years there was the same policy as
to commerce and contractual relations with people of

(4)
foreign nation until Rome took on a more cosmopolitan
form and became engrossed with the desire for political
power,and the policy then came so as to encourage commerce.
And at the same time in many other ways,laws regulated
the freedom of contract as it did their polical rights,
and we find that for the most part they were net the dictates of a tyrannical ruler,but laws having in mind the
welfare of the people,such as the people thought were
expedient.
Then came the feudal system,not of itself an institution founded on public policy,but never-the-less teeming
with its relations of status which restricted the freedom
of contractso that in time public policy,which had
gradually changedarose through a long struggle and for
once in its history enlarged the powers of contract.
The feudal system had culminated in the growth of townsof the village communitiesthe more modern patriarchal
families and tribes where the people were bound together
by the closest ties of friendship and kinship.
Here it was perfectly natural that such commanities
should long retain the. stamp of the original family relationthat the relative positions of the different members should

(5)
should be the positions into which they had been born-that
their mutual rights should be determined by the status or
condition in life into which they were born rather than by
contracts voluntarily entered into between free and independent men,and that custom rather than competition should
fix the serviced mutually due,and the compensation therfor
as well as the basis of exchange of products. In such
societies the ancient sense of loyalty and of duties take
the place of independenberand rights. Within such communitiescompetitive bargaining is comparitively unknown. Status
instead of contract,custom instead of competition,loyaltv
instead of independence indicate the leading contrasts
"I

between medieval and modern life".
"In the former a man was held entitled to a fair price
determined commonly by custom. The fundamental theory of
modern economy,that every man should be free to follow
his own pecuniary interests as he thinks fit,without fraud,
does not distinctly emerge until the 16th centuty in which
Shakespeare deplores the decline of the loyalty of the
antique world "when service sweat for duty,not for mead".

"I" T.E.Cliffe Leslie's Hist.& Future of Int.and Profit.
"2" C.A.Collin.

(6)
Never-the-less while this was the prevailing sentiment
of the current business morality yet the competitive princeple was constantly struggling to assert itself inspite of
morals and legislation.
Thus we have seen that freedom of contract was firt
limited by status-then by statutes in opposition to the
competitive principle. Such were the changes of public
policy in England as to the theory of freedom of contract.
In this age and especially in this countrywhere the
will of the people shapes the law,public policy is a more
potent factor than ever in deciding what the relations of
one person shall be to another as to the making and enforcing of contracts. But in the United States,the fact that
we have a Constitution which is the supreme law of the land,
must not be overlooked;

and except as public policy vents

itself in amendments to that Constitution it must remain
unchanged and upheld.
For the most part the Constitution is explicit enough
to guard against unconstitutional legislation,but there
is one particular grant of powers vested in both state
and national legislature in which public policy can most
easily exceed its right . I'refer to the "police power"
which ha§ been defined as-------

(7)
In its broadest acceptation,as the general power of a
government to preserve and promote the public welfare even
at the expense of private rights

".

The whole scope of legislation restricting freedom of
contract must be within the exercise of this prerogative

,

otherwise it is unconstitutional and void. Therefore we
must conclude that ,while public policy regulates the legislation in question,it only decides how far thw police power
shall be exercised . It may contract or enlarge the exercise
of its jurisdiction as the people see that the exigencies
of the time require.

THE NON-EXISTENCE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT.

Before we shall turn t& the exigencies of the present
time and discuss the Constitutionality of the remedies
that have been applied,it seems not out of place to consider
the present condition of that theory which so.closely
concerns ras-

"The Freedom of Contract".

In this elaborate and highly developed system of
government,we have been compelled to recognize the fact that
true liberty is not licence. So that what was once a moral
law forbidding persons to so exercise their rightd that

they interfered with the rights of' others,has now become
more or less embodied in the positive or civil lawand
properly so,now that we have a more correct idea of liberty.
And the topic now is practically to show the extent that
public policy has limited the former liberty of citizens
by this restrictive legislation.
Although it is urged by some that with few exception.
we now have freedom of contractthe facts of the case ought
to leave the potlt incontrovertible .The legislative and
judicial history of this country is repletb-,with instances
in which statutes impairing the freedom of contract have
been held valid and enforced against individuals as well as
y

corporations. Some of the principle ones that have been sustained and enforsed are the following: Fixing a maximum
rate of interest on money loaned; Fixing the maximum rates
for grain elevators and railroads; Fixing maximumiprice for
official reports of decisions

Fixing -the price of bread

Regulating insurance contractsand preventing forfeitures
for non-payment of premiums; Conferring the right of redemptiom after sale for breach of condition in a mortgagecontrary to its terms; Forbidding the retaking of propwrty sold
conditionally for non-payment of an installment,without a
tender of the sum paid on the property,after deducting a

(9)
reasonable amount for the use of the property or damage to
it ; Forbidding contracts for the attorney's fee on the
opposite party ; Forbidding gambling comtracts,and contract
between husband and wife ; and statutes regulating the sale
of liquors,of oleofargarine and of patent rights.

(10)
In the absende of legislative enactments,the courts have
the power to hold contracts upon many subjects to be void
and unenforceableas opposed to public policy : such as
contracts riot to resort to the courtsbut to submit to
arbitration; Contracts not to remove a cause from a State
Court to a Federal court : Contracts in restraint of trade;
Contracts waiving the benifit of stay of execution laws; and
contracts exempting a person or corporation from liability
for the negligence of his or its servants.
In these cases the courts have power to decide what
is public policy only because the legislature has not indicated its will to the contrary. But as seon as the legislature decides the questionits act is binding upon the
courts.
With these and other similar statutes,it is perfectly
ev&dent to the most casual *bserver that freedom of contract
from a legal point of view at least does not exist.
And moreover it would be a fiction to suppose that it
existed even if every statute on the books shauld be annulled,
for from a sociological point of view it will be seen upon
close study that this theory is illusory and does not exist
in practice. Every one knows that there is some measure of
truth in this.:lt.is axiomatic that dependence and not

(II)
independence is the order of things-and a most disorderly
order-with no regularity and no certainty. For one person
is financially dependent upon another who is in turn
physically dependent upon him: intellectual and financial
men are also interdependent ; ability in one profession
is exchanged for ability in another- and what aggravates the
whole social problem is that there are all these qualities
and powers bound up in somewhile in others we find barely
a trace of any: and again there are all degrees between the
two extremes.
And when the social order has thus been examinedno one
of intelligence will attempt to controvert the assertion
that however true the Declaration of Independence was in
asserting that" all men are created equal"-it is equally
true that all men are not living equal. And with such
inequality how can there be freedom of contract ? Not nominally so,but in reality.
Freedomso far as it existsis the right to do as one
pleases with himself or his property. Freedom of contract
is the right to limit that right. So that where 'two parties
do not meet on equal terms,free contract may be and often
is the surest means ef destroying freedom. And there are
instances of great number in which free contract now means
less freedom forever after.

(12)
Self-enslavement was an extreme case and belongs to the
past but there are instances involving the same principles
today; some of which savor very much of self-enslavement

itself.
In spite of the many regulations of contract-making
that are some-what pretective to the laboring classes,yet
the laboring man is under a decided disadvantage when making
contracts. He makes them- why ? Becauseto sustain lifehe
is obliged to

.

The ordinary man of better circumstances

must make them as welland the highly developed corperatiun
is not exempt from the"must";but while the two latter make
them to sustain life also,they are further from starvation ;
they can,having more resources,wait longer when driving a
bargain,can force their weaker bretheren to concede everything and need not themselves colcede anything. The result
of the numberless strikes throughout our history-their
almost universal failure- forces us to this conclusionif
nothing else does.
It is the corporation and individual with equal capital
who are considered respectible-never the laborer. It is
the corporation that is born of and supported by the government-petted by courts (though damned by juries' and

(13)
and empowered by the "almighty dollar". The corporation
has every thing -- the starving wage-earner,nothing. Economist5
have always been aware of the capitalist's advantage yet
they have contitually protested against any legislation to
equalize,in any degree,the power of men in their contractual
relations;and so strongly has it been protested in this
country,that upon our Corstitutionso full of true freedom
in every other respecthas been grafted the doctrine of
"laisser faire". The untruthfulness of this doctrine as a
universal poposition has long been established, but we
have not escaped its influence. The "Manchester School"
has strenuously upheld it and the free traders,like it
in other respectslikewise been consistently but fallaciously upholding itso that- t tiLhas! b e e n kceptedintpracti6e T-l
at least,not alone by the political party of free traders
but even by those who claim to be its strongest opponents.
The reasons for it have been manifold,but the chiefest of
which is its practicability and seeming justification.
Its fallacy in the assumption of the economical and
social efficiency of competition lies in the failure to
distinguish between services and commodities-between man
and merchandize. Man is looked upon as under the same
complete subjection to the impulses of pecuniary interest as
a bale of cotton is in the hands of a trader. With respect

(14)
to merchandize-destitute of sympathies or antipathiescompetition is,when modified,so far perfect as to be a fair
controlling power. But with man,especially the laboring man,
bound by manifold strong attachments to placebo home and
friends;without mobility,by will or ability; and the employer -generous as the world goes buzt controlled by his own
selfish interests-then it is self-evident that competitionsupply and.demand-"the iron-clad law of wages"-is not a
sufficiently adequate or just controller of labor as it
seems to be with other commodities. But, denying that labor
is a commodity at all-denying that man was meant to be a
machine, to be kept in the market subject alone to the
supply and demand,-denying it does not change the state of
affairs however as a fact.-labor is treated as a commodity
and mansa machine. As such,how can a man make contracts
freely and to his own tasteWith so few hands to work with
and so many mouths to feed -he must do whatever he can find
to do within the limited field to which he has access while
a commodity has the whole world for its range. If his
limited field is glutted with men he must work for what
any poverty-stricken single man will work for,or the single

man will get the position. If the times are hard,he must
endure reduced wages,for he cannot leave in search of employ-

ment.Yet he must pay the landlord whatever rent he demands.
The laboring man is thus pinched on both sides -and yet,

sometime- when this strange corcnodity becomes too cheap and
the house rent of the employer becomes too dear,we find
such an awakening of life as no other conuodity ever has,
and the sympathies and antipathies of the laboring man are
vented in such

Utivities as the late "Pullman Strike".

The strike has seldom been successful-yet when we consider
that

they are steadily

increasing in

number

ind magnitude,

we may be sure that no such movemnets are without great
initiatory

force and some element of reason and deterrhination.

To be sure,the question of "capital and labor"is here
the direct issue;yet the -trouble starts from the inequality
of the men in making their contracts and the injustice that
arises therefrom in the so-called "freedom of contract".
Then it is true that I have considered the laboring man in
particular as so unjustly treated from the unequal standing,
in his direct dealing with one of more power. Yet the same
is true as between even'the latter and one still str ngerindeed it very often compels the previous state of affairs;
and so on thrnugh all the stages of ability and resource.

(In)
The order of dependence

is most wonderfully developed,indeed

it is developed in a manner not to be

tolerated long by th

those most injured,nor fostered much longer by those
patriotic and humane citizens who see the injustice ,whenever they see a way to remedy it.

The American are already

awake to the problem,and contirnuous,persistent effort will
solve it " Laisser faire",in my jUtdgment will never accomplish it Legislation is a possible remedy. Still the
efficiency of legislation depends upon the general public
opinion,and any visionary schemes of legislation would not
be tolerated -at least for any length of time.

THE POLICE POWER.
The people of the American colonies by -the establishment of their independence held unto themselves all sovereign
power. As individuals -they provided for a form of' general
gevernment by adopting the Constitution

of the United States

and thereby marked out a somewhat definite and stable path
which they would follow , They reserved unto themselves the
supreme authority through the Constitution and the Congress,
yet delegating some concurrent tut subordinate powers to

(1'7)
the several States as sovereign bodies.
But it was not the design of the Constitutional Convention to hamper all the future Americans with the letter
of the Constitution. It wished to perpetuate its spirit,
!Liberty".So
clauses,

that I see in

the Amendment and general welfare

provisions purposely and deliberately constructed

with this end in view.In these clauses did the wise founders
of the Union provide for the progression that was hoped to
follow;

It put into the hands of the people great

powerso great that many have hesitated and questioned
whether these clauses really show the intent of the
Constitutional delegates.

Yet that police power,great as

it may seem to be ,is held down to true republican principles
laid down in the Constitution that are irrevokable,and so
interpreted in this case as to confine its exercise to
promoting the healthpeace and good order of the Nation.
And while public policy is so restricted by the limits

of this police power,the constitution has no control over its
exercise within those limits. Congress may be as changeable
and arbitrary in obedience to the will of the people as it
is pleased, and without conflict with the Constitution if
rightfully exercising its police power.

(18)

And the same is true of the State legislatures so far as
they have been vested with police power. For the U.S.Cons.
has thus allied for the elasticity of public opinion,leaving
it only for the courts -to say whether or not the legislation is constitutionalso that the legislature uses its
own discretion as to its expediency.
With this investigation of powers,we must conclude that
changes of public policy if exercised within the police

,

regulations,fickle as they may be,are entirely constitutional

CHANGE IN SOCIAL, CONDITIONS.

It is quite pertinent also to ask-of what need has the
public policy to change-espesially in regard to the regulation of contract-making. Men are the same today in their
nature as a hundred years ago. Granted--but are the surroundings the same now as then ? Does the economical and industrial condition of the country demand of each mar, to act
the same as then ? Is he even permitted to act the sameand live ?
If the country was the same size now as a century ago
when the Constitution was draftedor even the same as to

(19)
condition,the legislature would never be called upon t6
make laws that are necessities now. But the country has
grown from three million of people mostly on the farm or
in small villages to eighty million of people,the great
proportion of which are now congregated in cities ; the
country is now under industrial conditilis and influences
in the preponderance,whereas it was then mostly agricultural;and that thereby the order of dependence has
intensely increased. These facts account for legislation,now
a necessity,that wo dd have been anomalous in the past.
The problems of today are the result of the change; and
are in proportion to the innensity of the great industrial
departments out of which'they have arisen. The mechanical
inventions

together with the developement

of the joint-stock

principle has made possible a former impossibility and
produced the prodigious manufacturing and trading interests.
Individual production of the great portion of the commodities has given way to the large manufactures where the division of labor and machinary gives a difcided advantage.
And the laboring man no longer works under his own direction
but as an epployee.inder

the supervision and direction of

another. The order of dependence is here intensified.
In

fact the present century has witnessed

(20)
a rapid concentration of the industrial power into the hands
of a few.And where the power has been concentrated,responsibility has been lessened-- the stronger shifting it upon
the ones dependent upon him.
And this is most apparently truie in regard to corpora-

tions. The two essential principles which they involve,of
a limited liability and a power in each member freely 'to
transfer his holdings to any stranger,an essential to the
end for which they were established. So that,supported as
they are in these respects by the government,a man of usual
responsibility or without the franchises held by the corporation,cannot have the freedom of contract such as one
might have had fifty or one hundred years ago. He is either
precluded from making any contracts at all with corporations
or he must contract on such terms as he can get from the
corporation.

And the majority of wage-earners,who,without

capitalare forced to work for corporations-as all kinds
of' business are rapidly assuming the form of corporate
organization--are still less able to cope with the corporation in making contracts,and are thus "holding their
right to labor and their right to live,as tenants at will"of
the corporations.
Before the days of corporations and large manufacturing

(21)
interestswhen men were more upon an equality-when at least
all bore the same responsibility,it is possible that the
doctrine of "laisser faire" as applied to labor seemed more
plausible.

It certainly did not work the same injustice ther

for each man was more able to look out for himselfdealing
with men more directly,and the competition was not so great.
But now when competition for labor is so graat and when
the laboring man deals not with Ii,. individual men always
but with that inanimate body the corporation,the doctrine of
laisser faire does not work justice-indeed it works a decided injustice,and any such proposition has no legitimate
place among the principles of American liberty.

CONCLUJION

Over and above the fact that the majority of people believe
that the fewer laws the betterthere is a more or less
distinct conviction throughout the country that legislation
is the cure for all social evils,and one phase of this idea,
that inas-much-as legislation has to a great extent made
some of these evils possible through granting monopolous
franchises and patents to great manufacturing interests and
by protectiW these infant industries with high tariffs-that
new ,legislation should be the remedy for these unfortunate

(22)
social conditions that have been their natural outgrowth.
One of the most stiking examples is the demand for resttictive immigration and contract labor laws . The American
workman cannot compete with the pauper labor of Europe and
live in the comfort he now does-and the public has appreciated the truth of thisand legislation has followed such as
would have excited the whole commonwealth to opposition a
century ago-arid been considered as unnecessary and un-American.
But, the policy of the country has changed to a still greater
extent and in some cases demanded legislation which is

by

no means so apparently just or neede-legislation,as I have
said,to remedy social evils,a great portion of which is
really necessary for the welfare of the nation; and some or
perhaps all having this as an end-may not accomplish the
purpose of its projestors,or be of such a nature as to be
unconstitutional. In later chapters the constitutionality
of the most recent of these laws will be discussed at some
length.
Howeverthe changes which have occurred in-.public policy
this legislation seems to turn especially upon one proposi tion,viz. The relation of the fundamental rights of the
individual andthe police power of the State. The cause for

the change being that competition no longer works justice;
and the result has been, that while the fundamental rights
of life,,liberty and property are not to be assailled
without"due prosess of law" ,the general trend of public
opinion now is to restrain the use of property by the abridgment of the right of contract in the same manner and for the
same purpose that other personal rights have been defined.
The same motive that actuated the restriction of personal
liberty is now the force that upholds the restriction of
the use of property,which is,viz, to prevent the exercise
of the right of ownership by the few in such a manner as to
interfere with the rights of society as a whole. So that
now the "public policy" is that all business interests
which are"affected with a public interest" are amenable
to legislation.
As to what business employments are "affected with a
public"interest" remains to be determined hereafter.

(25)
A GNERAL VIEW OF ThI5

TE(IsLATION.

Not-with-standing the fact that there has long been

sor: e restriction upon indivtal freedom of contract and the
right of the legislature to pass laws of that nature under
the polioe power has been well establishedyet the Constitiltion is invariably invoked whenever a new law is passed )nd
the right to absolute freedom of contract is again declared
to be guaranteed every Individual in the Constitutional
provisions that "no man shall be deprived of lifeliberty or
property without due process of law" and reiterated in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.Constitution which further
provides that

"

no State shall niake or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or iamiviities of citizens of
the United States:nor shall any State deprive any person of
life,liberty or property without due process of law,nor
deny to any person within its juri.siction the equal protection of the laws."
The effectiveness of the constitutional guarantees to
individual rights against the police power of the State was
first bruoght into general discussion by the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Illinois and the TI.S.Sup.Ct. in 187
in what are comnonly called the Gr-anger Cases. In these cases
It was decided that it was lawful for the Statein the

(26)
exerose of itm polioe powerto regulate the conduct and fix
the maximum charge of compensation in such classes of businees as were "affeoted with V,'3- public interest" and that
the business of storing grain in bulk in warehouses,as well
as that of common carriers was so affected with public
Interest

It has since been establishedthat to the same

extent the legislature can control the right to contract in
reference to property" clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence and affect
the commminty at large". It is argued that-by devoting his
property to a use in which the public has an interestthe
ownerin effectgrants to the public an interest in that use
and subjects himself to the control of the legislatugr

for

the comion goodto the .extent of the interest he has thus
created,

on this principle the legislature regulates the

business of millers bakeirshackmen fevries ,wharfingers,
Innkeepers and the like.
Wherefore,many of our best legislators and judges are led
to believe that manufacturing and mining concernscorpoate,
or Individualwhioh funnish neoessaries of life as food,
clothingshelter or fuel to hundreds or thousands of the
public:or which employ a large number of the public,as working-men--anM are protected and defended by the publio at
th

public eexpnsear- particularly those which receive the

(27)
benifits of the fostering care of the public under a qysteTn
with
of prottetion_.these aloo,it is argued,are affected
control,
a public interest and therefore subject to public
"I"
And the most recent
under the police power of the States.
legislation of this general naturge is based upon this understanding of the scpoe of the police power *and have as their

espeOIal purpose the establishment of amicable and just
relations between the euPleyer and the employee. And there
is

a very gradual tendencyto distinguish between the employes

labor and the other commoditiosand to base labor laws on
somewhat the same grmmds as the usury laws are.
These proceed ,says Mr',Jstice Schofield in

(I-t

11"

Frorer v.Pea.

I1. 1,1 ) upon the theory that the lender end borrower

of money do not occupy towavds each other the qame relations
of equality that parties do InI contraoting with each other
in regard to the loan or sale of other kinds of property,
and that the borrowers necesitSes deprive him of freedom
in

oontracting,and place hm at the mercy of the lender".

The position of the laborer is analogous to that of the
borroweras I have shown in a previous chapter and my contention ithat

the laborer should have the same proteot ioa.

.S.164
Budd v.N.Y.I45 11.S.5SV ; Peo.vBudd 117 N.Y.I; Mun.v.Peo.
3 AlaI.37
; Mobille
6qj,80
W
Judge
Holmes v.YUille
In Comm. v, Perry-155 Mass. i7
U1"1 Mum v.Il.94 ijS. Ii3;Pelk v.Chi6& NW.Ry.94

(218)
ANrI-TRUK LAWS
The Truok System for the payment of wages otherwise
than in

lawf'ul money or otherwise than to the full NaPmnt

earned by the employee has been one of the most productive

sources of social disorder and oppression in the oivilized
world. It has enabled the unscrupulous employer to mulot his
workmen of a part of their earnings in a manner *Jux of ease
and seeming honesty that has for many years escaped the
charaoterization of fraud and the remedies applied to fraudulent dealing*and until recently such have been the past
doctrines of political economy as applied to the COnstitutions of our States and nation,that any legislation in
prohibition of the system has been declared unconstitutional
and void as extra-legislative interference with the right
of every individual to freedom of contract.
Whatever the prevailing judicial opinion as to the constitutionality may or nay not be at the present-it Is certain that the viciousness of this system has been recognized,
In Englandas far back as 1837,when the "Truck Ant.pf-Is:-2
.1Vch.37,was passed consolidating all previous acts

on

S*tutes of Edw.-IVc.I ; 8 EIz.c.7; 14 El1z~o.12; I Anne ch,
187 ; 9 Anne e,20; 20 Anne c.I6: I Geo. c.1; 12 Goo.-I c.X4
13 Geo.Io.,23; i5 Geo4.c. 8; 22 GeO.2 c..29; 21 Geo.2 c.13
S.0 Go.2 c.I2; I
Geo.8 c,56: 19 Geo.
c..49; 57 ro. coc.
115-122 :58 Goo 5 a.-5 ,

(29)
the subjectthe desirability of altogether doing away with
the system was appreciated. This act prohibited the ranu-

facturers of corn and certain other thtngs,and miners of

coal ,salt etc. from paying the wagus of their laborers in
anything other than the lawfial money of the realm.And the
application of this act has been extended by 50 & 51 Vict.
ch.46 and various other acts'

Buat the first Instance in which a legislature in the Unit
ed States presumed to make any such advance in the restriction of contractmaking is found in the Act of 1881 c.273 of
the Maryland laws, This act provided

"

that every corproa-

tion engaged in mining or manufacturingor operating a railroad in Allegany Countyand employing ten hands or more,
shall pay its employes the full amount of their wages In
legal tender money of the United States;and that any contract
by or on behalf of any such corporation for the payment
of the whole or of any part of such wages in any manner
than herein providedshall be and is hereby declared illegal
and void".
In the case of Shaffer v.Union Mining Co.(55 M.74)which
ocoured soon afterwards,the constitutionality of this law
was made the question at Issute:and after oonsiderate atten-

tionthe Court declared it
prinoples

not to be contrary either to the

of the State or 1,S.Constitution. The ground

(30)
upon which it

was held valid was that the power to require

a corporation to pay its

employes in a certain ruanner was

necessarily incident to the power which the legislature
possessed to " amend or alter the corporate charter of the
defendant.

But this

decision,so dependent upon a

special reasondoes not add mch to the jurisprIdence of
this subject-nor must its authority extend beyond cases of
the same material facts.
And it has been considered authority for preciselt such
cases~rot only those arising under the same statute but
those arising under similar statutes.

For since the passaFre

of the Maryland Ast not less than thirteen other states havt.
passed enactments of this natureand,where they have applied
to corpoi'ations,the courts In

their respective states have

held them constitutional on the same gromds.
And some courts have considered them unconstitutional.

"I"

"2"

Statutes not inv-.lid in Ind.Elliott' sSupp. sec.159,()-I60I:

Act of 1891 c.83 p,108; Act of' 1893 p.20I; Kan, Act of 18F:.7
c.17I; Ky. Cons.244; St's of T,(y.sec.,I55O;
Act

of I895:c..3 :
d.Acts of I880 c.273; kfo.R.S.of 1889 sec.7058: Acts of 1891
p.I,$
!)E.
Acts Of I[i<c.2So; N.J.1 .. of 187 p.750;sec3 and

p.13T5 seoI&2; Supp.of 1888 p.771 sec,7: N.YAots of 1889
c.38I; Ohio R.S.of 1886 sec.70IS-I6,;

P1a.Br.Dg.plo I
0

Acts of 1887 p.214 sec.

sec.7-II and p.2678; Supp.2412;

S.C.Stat.

of 1892 soc,2086; Va.Acts of 1887c.39I; Wash. Act of 1887&8

c.128 :vfVa.*Code of 1887 p.983 sec I-5;Acts of"1891c.'"2" nass.Act of I887c.31"9 held riot valid In Com.-Perry
155 Iass. I7
;Ill.Act of I89I Miay 281,sec.I,-2 same by Frorer
Vs P
N.o.T
.. ReIp.395 ;Pa.Act of 188I
Jan 29,ditto by Godcharles v. 'iguian 113r Pa.St.43I .W.Va.Act of 1887 p.981 by
State V.Goodwill 33 W.Va.179 :;o.Act of'9IpIS3 by State v.
Looais 22 S.W.Rep.

2-94

In the State of Indianawhere a law of this nature was
passed requiring the owners of mines to pay for the mining
of coal every weeks in lawful money of the U.S. and forbidding the exe*Ution of contracts by the employes waiving
their right to payment in

iioney,-there xxx another reason

was found for holding this ]ind of legislation constitutional
in

hhe case of Hancock v.Yaden.(121 Ind..66) What was the r

held can best be told in the words of the judge himself.
Judg;e Elliott~delivering the opinion of the court,said:
"It cannot be denied without repudiating all authority that

the legislature does possess some power over the right tO
contract;wAn

if it does,then there is nothing clearer than

that this power extends far enough to uphold a statute
prdvir ing that payment of wages shall be made in money,
where there is

no agreement to the contrary,after the ser-

vices have been rendered"

-"We

cannot ooneive

of a case in which the assertion of the legislative power
to regulate contracts has a sounder foundation than it has
in this instance.

----

-It is of the deepest

nd gravest

importance to the government that it should unyieldingly
maintain the right to protect the money which it

m7akes the

standard of value throughout the country. The surrerer

of this right might fmperil the existence of the nation itself"* "The provision of the statute to which our decision
Is dirctod

*opwrates upon all

members of the classes it

(52)
enmwrates.It neither cofers special privileges nor makes
unjust dl scriminttions."
Howevpr In this case also do we find the real principle

involved conspicuously absent and another *special reason"
relied ution.

The Justice seeme

to have been anxious to

hold the law constitutional and .having found another more
sound and certain basis,has dodged the point in question*

This has been thegeneral tendency of those courts which
favor the extention of these doetrine*. Even in the best
instance we have in support of this legislationthe court
confined the basis of its decision to that which was most
favorable.
The statute under consideration in this case-Peel Splint
Co,vs.State(

)was an auiementof a previous act

relating to the payment of lAs,.arx-the alteration being,
expressly int"n'rJ to remove the objection which persuaded
the court in State v,Goodwill(.3 W.VnI79)

to declare it

void as being special legislation :and the new provision

covered all "persons,firms and corporations engaged in any
kind of business".

FAt it

will be noticed that in this

docisionthe fact that the defendant was a corporation
played an Important part.

The Court says "We base our

decision ,firstupon the ground that the defendant is a
corpmation in the enjoyment of unusual and extraordinary

privileges which enables it and similar associationm to
surround themselves with a vast retinue of laborers who
rn~d to be protected against all fraudulent or suspicious
devices in the weighing of coal or in the payment of labor;
secondly, the defendant is a licensee,pursuing an avocation
which the state has taken under Its

general supervision for

the purpose of securing the safety of employes by ventilation, inspection and governmental report, and the defendant
therefore nmust submit to such regulations as the'sovereign

thinks conducive to public health~public morals or public
security."
It is unfortunate that another matter of constitutionality should be included in this case for it detracts from
the real merits of the point in question.
But it will also be noticed that the basis of this decision
is not the same as in the corporation casesof which Shaffer

vs.TJnion M.Co.(supra)is an example.The reason is no longer
that the legislature had power to"alter or amend"the provisions of the corporate charter:but because the corporations
and similar associations had unusual and extraordinary privi-

leges".

Judge Luccs says: We do not base this decision so

much upon the ground that the bmttx*imzxx business is
affected by the public use; but upon the still higher ground
that the public tranquility and the good and safety of society,demand,where the number of employes is such that

(3 4)
specific contracts with each laborer would be-improbable
if not Impossiblothat in generalcontracts justice shall
prevail as between operator ard miner; and in the companY's
dealing with the multitude of laboreras with which the State
has,by special legislationenabled the owners and operatOMS
to surround themselvesthat all these opportumities for
fraud shall be removed. The state is

frequently called upon

to suppress strikes;to discountenance labor consliracios;to
denounce boycotting as injurious to trade and ootmerce;
and It

cannot be possible that the same police power may

not be invoked to protect the laborer from being made the vi
victim of the compulsory power of that artificial combination of capital which special statelegislation has originated and rendered possible

It

is

a fact worthy of consid-

eration and one of muach historical noteriety that the court

may recognize it

judlcially.that every disturbance of the

peace of any magnitude in this state since the Civil war,
has been evolved from the disturbed relations between
powerful corporations and their servants or employes, It
cannot be possible that the state has no police power to the
pr teotio

of solety against the recurrence of such dis-

turbanoes which threaten to shake civil order to its very
foundations.

Collisions between the capitalist and the

workingmn endanger the safety of the sjatestay the wheels

of comerce and at times throws an Idle population upon the
bosom- of the comunity. Surelt the hands of the legislature
cannot be so restricted as to prohibit thopassage of laws
directly intended to prevent and forestall such collisions".
In reviewing the situation then we have the law partly
settled-definitely so in some cases and in others we have
decisions both ways. In the first placethere is no dispute
as to the strength of Hancock v.Yadon-that these anti-truck
or "store order"laws may be upheld on the basis of protecting the currency of the United States,
Secondly,that the state may make these laws In aenndments
or alterations of corporate charters where they have so
reserved that privilege.
Thirdly -as the Splint case decides -that corporations and
similar associations enjoying extraordinary privileges which
enables them to control a large nunber of laborers-or the
supply of food,clothing eto.,for a large number of people are
affected with a public interest and thus subject to state
regulation.
Fourth ,that while the laws declare individual persons in

the same btsiness also liable to these regulationstheir val.
idity is seriously questioned,

(:56)
FINES LAWS.
Another ant the latest kind of legislation to prevent
employers from defrauding their servants is etbodied in what
are ealled "Fines Acts". Within a few months during the
year of 1891,the legislatures of three states considered it
as constitutional as it was wise to pass these laws:Ohio

being the firstclosely followed by Illinois and Massach-usetts.
The Mass.Actknown as the "Weavers Fines Act"was the f
first to be declared unconstitutional as it was so held by
the Supreme C't of that state in the case of Cotuionwealth
v.Perry (26pra) very soon after its passage. The act in

question is as follows

0

No employer shall imi ose a fine

upon or with-hold the wages or any part of the wages of an
employee engaged at weaving for Imperfections that may.arise
during the process of weaving".
The same general reasons for declaring all acts which
interfere with the freedom of contract,are used in support

of this decislon:that it Is unconstitutional in that it
interferes with the inalienable right of
Ing arn

"

acquiringpossess.-

protecting propertyguaranteel by the state consti-

tution.by restricting the necessarily incidental right to

make reasonable contracts.
"I"

Ohio-Act of Apr.29,I891

Mass. -May 28 180I: act of 1890

:

Illinois.. Act of May 28-'91

c.410 .

The court does say that if

the act Wwent no further than to

forbid the iMosttion of a fine by an employer for imperfect
work At might be sustained as within the l0gislative power
confered by the constitution of this Coimonwealth in chap.

I sea.I art.4,whtch authorizes the general

"to uake

ordain andestablish
all manner of wholesome orders,lawssta*-

utes and ordinances -directions and instructions either with
penalties or wlthoutiso as the same be.not repugnant or
contrary to this oonstitutionas they shall judge to be fow

the good and welfare of this oommonwealtht nd for the governent and ordering thereofjand of the subjects of the same?
It might well be held that If the legislature should determine it to be for the best interests of the people*#that a
certain class of employes should not be permitted to subject
themselves to an arbitrary imposition of a fine or penalty
by theft employerit might pass a law to that effect",
But here the court makes a distinction

It foresees the

possibility of imperfeetion arising from two dIfferent s
sources-from the negligence -and from the want of skill of
the weaver,,

But it also sees that the fines may be imposed

arbitrarily as well as for these imperfections;andlt allows

that the legislature might pass laws to prevent such impositions-If it could.

But the court says "when an

attempt is made to compel paymuent tunder a contract for
good work where only inferior work is done,a different question is presented--

If the statute is held to permit a

manufacture to hire weavers and agree to pay them a certain
price per yard for weving cloth with proper skill and cars,

it renders Ma the contract of no effect when it requires
him ,under apenalty to pay the contract price if the employee
does his work negligently and fails to perform his contract.
For it is an essential element of such a contract that full
payment is to be made only when the contract Is performed.
If it be held to forbid the making of such contracts and to
permit the hiring of weavers only upon terms that prompt
Tpyment

shall be made of the price for good workhowever

badly their work may be done and that the reTmdy of the
employer for their derelictions shall be only by suits
against them for damages #it is

interference with the right

to make reasonable and proper coxntraots in conduoting a
legitimate business which the-Constitution guarantees to
every one when it

declares that he has a natural,inalienable

right of'acquiringpossessing property".
The lengb), with which I have quoted from this decision
is

not because of any particular rmerit in the case but beo

because it is
which

the only case of direct

judicial authority In

an opinion has been written .See notE

"I"

on next page

(39)
Wt however valuable Justice Knowlton's opinlon may be of
itself-the authorities in support of it are noticeably weak,
for nearly all have been over-ruled ;or the statutes *hiich
they declared invalid ,so remedied as to be now considered
perfectly constitutional,
It was also declared that this law impaird the obligation of
contractsbut Judge Holmes conclusively points out in his
dissenting opinion that this Is a very weak position as it a
could ii no way apply to contracts made after the act in
question and he further declares that In his opinion this
legislation did not interfere with the right of acquiring

possessing and protocting property any more than the laws
against usury or gaming ,and these are indisputably within
the police power.
for dissenting

TBit he had still stronger reasons

o. f'oresaw the object of the legislature

and the legitimacy as well as the justice of' this act.
"I suppose ,he saysthat thls act was passed because the operatives or some of them thought thaft they were often cheated out of a part of their wages under afalse pretence that
the work done by them-was imperfect,and per.uaded the
-

--

----------------------

"I" A similar decision was made on the same day in case of
Commv.Potoaiska Mills Corporation

1

Mss I1/

.noe,

For further discussion of principled involved see: Godoharles
v.WigeMan 133 Pa.St.43I: State v.Goodwill 53 W.Va.179
In re Jacobs 98 N.Y.98 *PeoMarx 99NY.377
109 N.Y.339 VMillett vPeo. 117 111.294.

Peo.v.Gillson

(40)

legislature

legislature that their view was true.

If their view was

true,I cannot doubt that the legislature had a right to
deprive the employers of an honest tool which the were usin
for a dishonest purpose ,and I cannot pronounce the legislation voidas based upon a false assmwption since I know
nothinr about the matter one way or another."
This view takein by Judge Holtes seetas to be the souder
and more liberal one.

To the legislature is

confided the

generous power to make such laws as it shall deem f&t for
the general welfare,subject of couse to constitutional
limitations,

Surely it may consider the fact that employers

may possibly oppress their employes by arbitrarily with-holding their wages on any pretext,and that such was a common
occurrence,

And an Rct in prevention of it would seem a

wholesome and reasonable law for the good and welfare of
the public.
The act does not pretend to deprive employers of their
remedy for imperfect work by action. They still

have this

reiedyand the fact that it r iay be practically worthless
is

no ground for declaring +.his act unconstitutional .And

firthermore the high purpose of the legislature which
prevailed in the passage of this act is further vindicated
by the spirit

of fairness to the employer in

hhe subsequent

(41)
act of 1892,repea3Ang the act of '91 and providing

"

that

no fines shall be imposed for inflirfections in the work

of the weavers unless the defects have be(..n shown to the
employee and the amount of penalty agreed upon by employer
and eiiployee". 13ut

,hls statute has not yet been tested so

leither have those of Illinois or Ohio,so that this legislat
tion as a whole does not rest upon a very sound basisztherv
being only threeinstances in alland in no case has there
been a judicial opinion expressed declaring their validity
Stll;,even though they are in the border-landthey have not
been considered so Inexcusably vicious or assuredly invalid
bhluthat they have survived for thtree years with out being
contested.
In my opinion-so long as they are reasonably
construed and have for theit prime object the prevention of
fraud,they are and ought to be considered as valid expressions of the police power.
"I"

The Ohio and III.

industries.

Acts are more general-applying to all

The Ill.st: tutetmuch like

the last

Mass.aot

,

prohibits fines or deductions for any reason except for
lawful ohecks or drafts advanced without discount and except
such simns as may be agreed upon between employer anrv

employe,

which may be deducted for hospital or relief fund for sick
or injured employes,

(42)

PAYMENT

LAWS

It is a singular fact that so many statutes regulating
the time when employers shall pay their employes should have
been passed in the different states -at least fifteen-

when

as a class they are so near the border of tunconstitutionality."2"

With the same possible oppositioo

anti writh no preten-

tion to the virtue of a preventive of fraudthese acts have
been passed ,and existed almost without any judicial authority:and the authority which they do have ,as expressed i.,
the leading cases ,is based only on the sound principle of'
corporate ohatter amendments"with additional argumients on
the grounds for their existencewhioh some consider as
rightfully applicable not only to corporations but as to
other associations havinw great advantages.
"1" Ark.Act of 1889 c.6I ; Cal. Act of 1891 c.146 P.I95

Conn.St.of 1888 c.106 sec.I748-52 ;Ind.Act of 1889 p.144
ljurn's R.S..gec.7059 ;Act or 1891 c.83 p.108 ;Kan.Act of 1893
c.I87 p.270 : Me.Acts Of 1887 c.I34.;Nass.Aot of 1886 c.87 ;
Act of 1801 c.239 ; Mo.R.S.of I880) c.42.art.I and ch.II5
art.I ;Act of 1891 p.183 ; N.H.Act of 1887 c.26 ; N.Y.Act of
1890 c.388; Act of 1890 c.388; Act of 1893 c.71? . ; Ohio
Act of 1887 p.214 sec.I as amended 1890 Laws of Ohio Vol.87
p.78; R.S.of Ohio 1890 vol.2 sec.8769 ; Penn.Br.Dig.p.I01O
sec.7-8;Act of 1887 No 121; Br.D1ig.(supp.)2412; same 2P78 ;
R.I. Act of 1891 c.918 ; Tenn.TAws of I89I-ex.sess. ch.5
Va.Act of 1887 c.393 sec 1-2 ; Wis.Act of 1889 C.474.
Wyoning Act oR 1891 a. 82 .
"2a" Braoeville Coal Co.v.Peo.147 Ill. 66
State v.Brown &Sharpe M'fg Co 25 At.Rep. 246
Loop v.St.Louis I.M.&S Ry. Co 25 S.W.J-?ep. 75

(C)
In the case of State v,Brown & Sharp* & Co.(supra) the Sup,
Ctof Rhode Island also avoided the real authority which the
legislature attempted to use-its police power-and decided
the case wholly on the ground that the legislati-re exercised
but its acknowledged power to amend corporate charters.And
the same would probably have been held in
vill

Coal Co.v.Peo.(supra)

the case of T'race-

had not the statute been con-

sidered as special legislation in that it referred only to
certain corporations while it did not affect other corpoeations created under the same generallaws.

I.Ry.Co.
And in the latest case of Leap v.St.Louis I.M.&
supra), the law was held constitutional as applying to corporations but not other wise.The statute there in question
required all corporations,companies and persons engaged in
the business of operating or constructing railroads to pay
thpir employes on the day of their discharge all trpaid
wages due themnat the contract price.
that the legislatuvw cannot make it

But the court htId

unlawful for individuals

to agree with each other that wages shall be paid at any
time after pxymxt the day on which the labor by ,'hich they
are earned shall be completed
sold shall be paid on

,or that the price of property

gven day after the sale,since such

a contractlas to the time of performance,is necessarily

harmless,and' of purely private concern",

Dut as usual

the judou here grapples with another fallacy and calls it

(44)

truth, He too considers labor a coiwiodity ant

fails to dis-

tinuish If from property.
.vYThls legislation

is to onable the laborer to have an

irfnmdiate rtiturn for his work-becauzse of his especial need

-

and to prevent the employer from with-holding his vages
that he may enjoy their profit a. long as possible . It
not be considered pure frauid

can-

but dishonesty ,and the legis-

latures ,in that it is so disadvantageous to the wage-earner,
consider it public policy that the laborer be protected.
Neither need the wage-earner feel that he is being made infantile by this protection to his wages. Soine deluded
conservatives have so held,

But the fact that this legis-

lation is ofteh sought for and obtained through the labor
organzations,refutes this.

These statutes vary in relation to businesse;s included,
the time for payinent and the means of enforcement Buttheir
general object is to relieve the la orer.Whether in fact
this relief has a constitutional basis remains to be geomrmined.

But the legislation has been so general_atnd so

generally accepte"i that the probabilities are that it will
be upheld. The fact that it simply precludes the employers
from making illegal or at least dishonest prodits causes him
to object with less earnestdess than he would if some mater-

(45)
kal and valuable right had been invaded,and to some extent
aooounts for the limlted nduiber of cames contesting this
legislation.

( 46 )
LAWS RFTGTJiATIN(, THE HOURS 07 LABOR

Contracts of employment have been regulated in rary states
by statute not alone as to the time and method of paym~ent.
oil"

lu also in

respect

These statt

to the hours of labor.
in

however differential

the details,aivi

lengthof a regular day's labor;

te,

to dutermilne the

the reasons for which are

protect the laborer from oppression of

two-fold:firstto

an± employer who may compel his employes to work as many hours
in

it day as

they deSire--the

same aA the law protects him

from the abuse and oppression in regard to ttme and method
of payment.Or secondl,,to protect

the health of the public

and the laborer

--------"I"

-----------------------------------------------------------

Statutes applying to women and children

. Ala.Act of

1887 no.149 sec.I * Cal. Pen.Code sec,651; Act of Ir89 c.7
Conn.!St.of I088 c. I0)( sec.I745 ; Ga.Code of 1882 seo.I885
,of IR8! c,,5 :4ec,212,5 ;EFlliotsq
IllAct of 189,, p.99 ; Ind.
Supp.c.2 sec,346-17 ; Act of 1893 c. 78 ; La.Act of 1886
No.43 sec.4

;

le .R.S.oi

188,'1 c.48 secI

,

Act

of I8_:7 c.

IM9

sec.I ; Md. Code of rlen.Pub.aws of 1888 art..7 sec,'I,'-40 ,
Mass. ,;t.of 1882 c.74 ; Act of 1884 a, 275 ; Act of 1890
c. I8 ; 892 c.357 p.37tf ; 1894 c. 508 sec . 10-i,- 1 MIch.
Acts of 1885 nq 79 t Act of 1887 c. 152 ; Act of I6W4o.2;5
2 ; Act of 189 c.96
.24 soc.IJ
Minn. ren.St.of 1878
N.H. Act of 1887 0.25 & PuboSt.c 180 sec.14 ; N.Y.Act of
IP 86 suc.6986 : Act of' i890 o.39R : Pa T3r.DIg.p.77I ; Act
of 1889 no.235 R.I .Act of I885 c. 51()
c.2,2 s-oC.45'"
RS.of I;0
S.D.Pen.Code c.57 sec 7359 ; It
Va. Act of 188 9-90 c, I91 ; Wis. Ann. St. c.13' , p. O2,

(47)

By'far the greater number of laws have their foundation in
the lattr reason and these apply liostly to enployes of
railroad.s and
pecaliar

to worvien

incapabilities

rind children either
or

because of the

the extra-ordinary

positions of

these persons

InPeo.v.Phyf(,Justice NMaymard says in ruspect to the
right of the legislature to limit the days labor of railroad
employes,that " In view of the great danger to and even
the destruction of life and property which might result from
the atteiopt of men,whIo have becomie enfeebled by prolonged
and exhausting effortto control enpine- and cars when in
motionit might be claimed that it was within the province of
the legislature to enact such a lww and make the violation
of it

a crime ;that it

ice power of the state:

wa., a reasonable exercise of the polind was also -a lawful asscrtion of

its reserved right to regulate corporations of this charac-

ter in their relations to the public

".

The validity of

such laws is xdoiubtedly acknowled1:ed so long as the pt blic
--------------------'IT" Sta.tutes applying only to railroad eynloyes. Cal.Pol.
Code sec.

if46

; Col. Act oi' 1891 p.284 ; Florida ,Act of

I195 c. 4199 ; Ya. Acts of !893 c. .386 ; Acts of 1S94 c.508
sec.9 ; Mich. ,ct of 1893 p.27 (; ; Minrin, Act of IW35 c. 206
sec.l"2 ; Act of 1891 c.17 ; Montana Act of I89.i p.67 ;
1I.J. Act of 1887 c.112 ; N.Y.Act of If-"l c.5,29 ; Act of
1892 0.711 ; Ohio Act of' 1890 c. 10 ; Act of 1892 c.259
Pa. Act of 1887 nq.I0 .

(48)
as the public health is the object of protection.
It

is

still

more obvious that those statutes applying

to women and children :ire legitimate applications of the
;io.lce power-to preserve the pLublic health. Th
6f having healthfuil wortien anr% children1 is
anr'

it

bpcause of the physicafl

is

classes that especial protection is
In

the case of Couwn.

v.u.ton

liaportance

f*,illy appreciated:

inferiority of these
glve:,.
V.f' ,. Co (.120 Mass.. Fs8-J)

statuite prohtbitlng the emiPloyment of' all persons ander
the a7e of' eighteen,arid of all women,in labori-ig in any
manuf-inturing establishment iiore than sixty hours a week-

violates no right resemred under the constitution to any
Individual citizen,ari may bh
police regulation.

It

maiiteir eri as a heAlth or

does not forbid any Person firm, or

corporation from employinF) as jiai_.laborers of this class,
as such person5s,fir'm or corporation should desire.

legislature has deemed it

But the

to some extent dangerous to health

that theqe persons should be couipelled to labor more than
eight

a dtak day or sixty hours a week inall

-

manufacturing

estahlshen

ts.

,(eneral statutes , Col. Act of 1:';94 c.( : C(a. Act of Im,9
p.If' : Idaho Act of I91 p. I-,91 ; Kan. Act off I-)I c.1!4
ass. Act of I ,, e, .
'. Ir.7579 '1C ; liW7, -:.40€i ,I;
i8)
c.

5o8 p.
Act of1

79 ; 'orj. cod
.2
,.402
),,

ofG
; Neb.

of
iirt
Act of I.c'I. c.54

.Pub.law

( 4W)

Not

indeed does it violate what is called "hte sacred right

of labor" belonging to each ini:rlvidual iii these classes,and
ff" it in ~x kx

the exerciso

accordance with their owvn jLudpi

These laws do not forbiri tteii, workin, Jis loni-

mlent .

a,,

they plense airj in

prohi bits thLc
.

cerhii

any prrticu,: ir biwije:.-s,
It it.*-rely
cont inoously
beinfr t irployed lix ti s,.';:ie servict iiorf, that,

ur[:ber of iours per.day or weeki-,d

this is

cer-

tainly i valird provision for the public health.
"The

general rul, undoubtedly Is

liberty to pursaue any lawful
own wa

that any

elrsoj

i:s at

c-llinR ;nd to do so in hi-;

riot encroa hinp" upon the rights of oth ers ".

13t

here

-is elsewhere It. is proper to recognlze disttiti,,/l':

rest

in

the ntuire, of things . FOhte

ploy i:t5

h

iay afllisa-

1,le for tiules and ii:proper for fevialesand Tegulation.S
the impropriety

exercising

thela wold

and forbidding woiuvn

erl
open to no reasonable o6t-jection

trite of young- children whose

CnhRagLL;

. The

i.

-ac is

:rmployzuwnt In itines and ,t.tnu"I "&2

facturies

is

cora ,only and ought

to be regulated

-----------------------------------------------------------continue'iI N.J.Act or l8C
c.S 2 ; N.Y. Act of I
c. !
Act of I;4 c.P22 , 'z.C. Act of If2 p.V'- ; Act of ]Y<'
Wyo~inF
ch.

Act of IPI

,

TJ*.*

27 St.

4O

,

c.
i~h Act of I394

!I
"I" FStatutes poii
rc
rr~~
~icid
ocrwIe~ily
unt-tq.
Ill.. Ac t. o-'
.f:'1
*;7
I 897- .
In.Act o
i
_4,c.78 ;
AcP of
c.C; .- Ohio Act o(--, !I
17~7 ;'T<f;
; 'reri Art of'
c.2715 ; Pa. !vt of 3IR9I
Ir9- c.IS
; Wash. Act of 1891 c.g; ; W.Va. A't of' P 'c 19
Jis. Act of Ir )I c. I(4
.
"2" From Ex.Parte
-:ubnck
,5 C:-l. 274
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that any person whr, exhlbWt4

Cod c- declares

Tht, N.Y.Vev,.

a female child under fourteen years of age or who,having
care of' such a child as parent

or exhibition a!

li

.

to her employment

,. theatrical

exhibition,or

a danc-r or i.;A

)r.y exhibition d.,ngero.is or injurious to

health or lorals.

te

Andl

o

the child

case of VJeo.v,

lau; constltitoi,:dl

*

-slyiig

t not onry Lu Onf-i

,

t kt(-? or" soyrei.
arid 82f'u
fr

y

,is

.v(.r (141

IR,)

bile

it

ei' mat r - a.(
th-,t is

,i;:iL ,

ir-

cerft-i% oc

atlr:cI.t (,orf.-in .hnt
other er;,

i,

i' trade,

'hieb the

ecOOFnti2?.5 aS proper

at all

'e

enalienable

that

.

the hoQ

voyrer-tM
It is
ithem

t

children

wOr, e" ,nd

Ltpatio

can

I0
isdeeanor.

pursw,

_t

t'he 5 8 e a'-A thuA4 .forlid

If

is

.s
pAti)e

".ren

,

deelares this

,to

lawtf 4

ihe life

o-1ntt..

! .V.

,that

of thf- child , evit

right
i

,consents

'

It.

of
w s

necessary

would
,vl er.-

seevi
in

for the public

hual th.
T,I- vieei

the le,

sJ.aturt

- makes these

any other basis the saite loijt
as i

(

prni) tic-

cIty Of TAs,'.A
contractor

siolir-z

(o

,i.y

ele
e.paoy
'

courf
rtir

held
It,

, ..v pe rso,

t

I ation

unrie

prevent

any

coltract

)

on

v.!irdity attsches

Th'-

1n

,

x Part.

Hha ft oin ovdin ,nce of the ci
isJ.rl
to

jeqnor

.ori<

morfe

foV

"

v-itl

r'ny

th,-in eight

or to o,,i,2poy C'hin-,4e labor ,'hre

to 1,e performwr

nitteritptto

to its

of' -inti-truck or -tine.

the (Y.c-

'. ]Jiack

a-

re

the work is

the city,ls
.ts es

n;
t, ,

nrt enforee their contrnat,
*'1

ordinance

not

attempt,; to creot*e

is

ILot

'ppearlm.

-

iz
,

valid exercise

Criinal offensqe.

of the police power

B.t this case

s ome -especJ; 1..i

a,1lows that, publIto policv may -L-phold
fior 'oii!

,iioloyrfwnts unfit

&- d

childrt:n.

)
whih are

, ,oyvm-it'

s

jS that tlhfr'e are ntll~er,

.s females

persons,sii

of these rerulattiohls.

does hot precl:zde the ros,4illity

regard to

and children is

It

in

The fact

-!},!inently

.

danger, us to male laborers ,is those lf. which the
woi-e

,it

yr1n-rt Was
1hat. fhe '-Mp3o.

forthdden oi, that grorid

or infantsor

Ruch

that the services to be perforied w,-re Un-

h-., inVIft Vor crt,:dri,

Ait

mld void

li-jcT-titltiona

gvinst pub!ic policy or

lawful ovt
such

-,n

it

-

is

of thtt right of such persons to make

a diredt ifwrilnment

SO fa'

,and

for their service'

and paying th

!lawful busiiess

labor of

regtlated . For whiat rewson therefore

should riot laws regi.lati-,F

such emiployr eJt'

be considered as

Y.'And whon the labor

validl,sanitary

wi police regulatiors

of maiiy or 2IlI

ti[oymierits become :-o exhaustive arnri injurious

to ptlblic.

deem it

ieoalth

biecessary

if

proloFged

Iii the cas c of' 1r,,:

here

legislature

i,

days

.

ee-s Prirtir,

of' provide,

,in

cliss.-s of mechanics,.servants .,r
engaged

not the

tothe public health that hours of -

or week' s lahor be derfiri(d

tl-ie act coiplainieo

-mlay

Co.- ,

efftvct,

th -t

Ii,
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for all

isborers excepting those

rlJ 'fa'i , o '
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c
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case

)the court

r'ecard to art amnendrment

,xceift

,

,

s

I;],oi4,e]1y
. r

re ;:ight

,In

tt
h

-,,lvi1

ildr'en, thvy t-re

the lt test

T ht

lrer,

to

, Will
aore-

and factories'"-

that

lm.

'"V
- j
jI

tr-or~i

tio

n

tr1

th,

jlI,,

,f

,Col.

there on applicatiwI

which shoillrd apply onl.to "
rN:ines ,snelters

.:h

h orit-'

-vs i nterfer i*P, w if h

* iCep. '<

o:rl

Coll/;4.i tfiltiobl'

.

atre concl tsivel.y for thiei.W,,ii
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seeims to hold with it,

to woI <eri
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,
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t
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before the
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oriiial.y
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the last
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I d

titutc
and

'V"

hi

the

Year

y

tirer.
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'

for

,i:rloyer

.''.n,.Ct of'

wif.?

of the, provi
h

1o1,v
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'. i'of:

!ush

i

-:c
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4

l

beer. rber,-e'

l
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not

I
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ft he

,-

the sititatior, of gener,1

OT-'

on.-
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he Citv of Bt3ff' I

I of Art,,14 of the
3rt
a

-

He,,.rarreT

riolatirn,

or' ill

o

,

isi ;ly

in
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v,W-:; no tlpfcorI.fttiOrI2.lvoi"

the provisions of sect.ior

(ie

Howrcrver it,

.

stood -prov dif:v t,.nt,

Inlorer ander contrant

af eiht

cn.me

tonal

rieclared tffit the statute fixin-

'v:ork "(.:r a,.

o)T

if.

i'k i1.b,

.,

','1ith

itut

n-

.the hill

i

tmco

ri..

,v
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,Cov.or

1i*.

; -nrl

this

te court.

l->v's regulatinri the

hou's of labor.
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dren-'t~
,,r0

.egality of those alit.) yInin

rail roar.

ituttional
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.Vl.Tlew
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(FaMPLOYERS
LA Vc F01,1331 1ING

TO R Q'JIRE THAT

NOT MELON(, TO 1ABOR IPNIONF.

THEIR EM'PLOY'( ; SH-AI,

The unfriendlly rivalry ol' cApitalist

drirl labor union has

hbroutht many of* the former to ri position where they wil not

employ uieinhbers of labor ml-ons . Further they have tried to
covcpel any such

who hYp pe

draw fron th(' UYnion a1
to ,ioin it

,Thr

to be intheir E!ploy ,to with-

to cmuipel others to agree

etvqloyer certainly has a riglt

noti

to emjloy

only those whom he wishes ; but has he the right to coerce
his !--en ,by contracts forced upon thetatr, refrain from join-

in

anjy society whatever

''.

Many legislatures have passed laws forbidding such contracts ."

Massachusetts has. the following act.

"Any person or

cerporatlon,or agent or officer on behalf of suCeh paerson or

corporaton,who shall hereafter coerce or compel any person
or oercons to enter into an1 ar reement,either written or
verbal,not

1-o join or become a member of ai-,ty labor organi-

zation,a z a condition of such person or iderson s securinrg
"I" Cal.Act of I89i o.I,49 ;Ga. Act of I8)P pj.I8,7 ; Ida,Act
'
c.76 ; 111. 1891 p.98
of Iq9R p.IS2 : Ind. Act of
P.I22 ; I8
).I7
330 ; mo.Act of 1
Mass.Act of £092 c.21
.
14.J.Act of I094 c.21", : Ohi ; Act ol' 692 c,22
112"

Mass.Act of I

2 -zO
C..92

)

( F)r
employlifunt or contidi

n,;

ply',mtrA of n-,y such

ii- the.

person or corrporation,shlall le puri.';he

K,.y ,:fi.

of Lot

more than on , hufidred diollars ."
WIitiout question this is
contritne.

Its

legitiimacy is

a limitation on freeom of
uncertaini

,n

there has been no

sound authority givec by the courts
In

DTh-vis 1,r.

Ftate ( 70 Weekly 1,,xw Tmllehtihi 742

court of Coninon Plea.- of iiamilto- Co. ,Ohto
nature
cases

;,as ieclarer
in

of, this

; and there i.y

the laborer ha.; a ripoht

organizaticr
-

co

be other

the lower courts not reported.

Certainly

right

constitutioi3a)

,la

) the

he may choos2

anl each does so

the State his defmer

it.

it

to belong

to any

jvust as the ehpioyer ha.s
his risk.

13WO

fh

the same

potit, is-

contrary to the welfare of the*

public,thot the employer should take advantage of his great
power over hi

laborers and subject them to any agreenment

his whims or his interests

them

In-a--mmh a.

should

the legislature ha-, found this op-

pression and sought to rei tedy it
hitherto in
-Lp-hold it.

cayuse hitu to lay before

along rt asonalIle lines,

other cases consAidered valid ,the courts shol'-,

CONCLUSION

It

is

law
in

urged

,'hlch are d'sismed

strictly

because

private

a

case

employments are ,Onconstitutiona] ,

in

which there is

nt

vi th one's natUral
trespass upon private

and no threatening, injttry to the public"

suchlabor disturbances as we have witnessed
years -to

.hat

to regulate the Oermns of' hirinf7.

they operate as an interference

liberty,in
right

,y 1,,r.Tiedrnan ii, his "Police Power"

in

B3ut with
rast

the

quel which R large armjres were necessary

which rewulted in much bloodshed -J.;.

cani

feu

and

be said

£
now vvith any de-ree of truth that there is no threatening
injury to the publicl?

Contii uiiar kX.Tierhya,says

:"As soon a,, the law places

one,for aliy just reason ,under a risabllitfvor gives to
other

jjrivilege-hiot elnjoyed it.

U;-

romrno)i by all-pr# otection

from oppression becoles a duty 'of the Stateso far ns the
disability or its

cause *or .the grant oi'-privileges produces

or renders. opressiot. possible

.

lere corporations are

es:ecially referred to,bu.t,

the frautds which corporations

mas, y perpetrate are ouite

likl.

C:

anincorporated associations

ni

froii these the laborer should b)e

to be perpetrated by
i Aividuals a- Well,
rotiectedl as Well.

As a ral..workmen and e:wloyei's

en11age"

and

should ziaku their

on

engagements and in particularly,

-iold' ifluly

agree as to

wages . Never-the-lesq there is a dictate of nature more
imperi',us-that reriunrsoatior. sholild he enough to sapport, ir
reasonafl.e comfortthe lahover and h1-, f'aj4!i.y ,i'or he is
The frauds made against him Ly

entitled to stich a farvAly.

of that remuneration and it

the empl~yer deprives "ii.

is

the

duty of the State to protect him.
is malde woirder-

T he ahsurdity of the- "laisser faire
fully clear in the recent case of' Godrharles
(II"

Pa.St.

-igeman

".

4. I ) Mr.Justice Gordon says this Act

istjan

infringement alike of the right of' the employer anid the

employe; more than this ,it

is

an insulting attempt

the laborer under a legislative tutelage,

which is

to put
not only

degrading to his man-hood bu(it subversive of' his rights
af-; a citizen of the T:tited. States.

lie ray sell his labor

for what he thinks best,whether o~oney or goodsjust as the
ermployer may sell his iron or coal,and any and every law
that proposes to prevent him from so doln,c is an infringernent of' his constitutional guaraniee privileges amd consequently vicio~ts arld void
But there are thosc

".

iho agree that this is

have,6rn the grounds of public pollcy,protected

not true and
the opiressed

laboring mian.
--------------------------------------------------

"I"

Act to prevent fraud in the weiJ-UngrF of noal , f, riines.

10r. Justice

!)'otests

T3rroughs

avo),isf

in

Ric

rdson v.

,]sh

2 Bin?2.

r&,.lr

tc,

strongly tLfoL pulic

pA

hotse

hrd when yoti or:ce get az-;trlde

icy.

-i (ar.y

It

is

au

nr',itly

will neve1 , knov, whore it
front the sowuir
But this

is

not

road to despotism -where

Amnnin"

t

It

I;Aay lean

you

you

la,".

country

,'nrd Liberty is

carry yoi..

will

it

,ir

1y

o~ini>n, travellin:

fi'eedomi of cojrtract

riot . Thp f",ct i.

that ieo!,].

is

the ro

worthless ,

sre

1,i;st

he-

distinguish between property ri,:hts aiA personal

rights correctly ;ind to appreciate that one iuay 1* abridged
as well as the other
Hitherto the judges of this country have been too caref'll of th-e
sacrificed

....iprop(-rt, ! rights
,ersonnil. rights . If'

ord

in

so doing ,have

they continue to over-ride

the personal rights of our lahor*rs,hy declaring these laws
.uconstituti,,na ],I
follow

cain see only ont

co nolti5on.

There will

1 seriesof con.titutional r/n]endiments that,'ill

these retiedies pos.ible;and capital and lrd)or ,"ll
estranged.

Ioweuer

lev~i slture;s ani

If

I

discern the fultuir.

make
the mor,

policy of our

courts with any degree of correctness-there

will be no occ.msion for

x

such a revoliktion in- th-; la-.,. -for

the whole sale oppression of the lalorer 'rill

prohibited.
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